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Abstract 
An interesting decision-making problem is that of aggregating multi-agent preference orderings 
into a consensus ordering, in the case the agents’ importance is expressed in the form of a rank-
ordering. Due to the specificity of the problem, the scientific literature encompasses a relatively 
small number of aggregation techniques. For the aggregation to be effective, it is important that the 
consensus ordering well reflects the input data, i.e., the agents’ preference orderings and 
importance rank-ordering.  
The aim of this paper is introducing a new quantitative tool – represented by the so-called 
p indicators – which allows to check the degree of consistency between consensus ordering and 
input data, from several perspectives. This tool is independent from the aggregation technique in 
use and applicable to a wide variety of practical contexts, e.g., problems in which preference 
orderings include omissions and/or incomparabilities between some alternatives. Also, the 
p indicators are simple, intuitive and practical for comparing the results obtained from different 
techniques. The description is supported by various application examples. 
Keywords: Decision making, Multi-agent preference orderings, Importance rank-ordering, Ordinal semi-
democratic, Consensus ordering, Paired comparison, Consistency. 
1. Introduction 
A relatively little discussed decision-making problem is that of aggregating multi-agent preference 
orderings into a consensus ordering, in the specific case in which the agents’ importance is 
expressed in the form of a rank-ordering. The problem of interest is characterized by the following 
elements:  
 A set of alternatives to be prioritized (a, b, c, d, e, ...); 
 A set of m decision-making agents1 (D1, D2, …, Dm) expressing their opinion on the alternatives, 
through preference orderings (e.g., a > [(b ~ c) || d] > e >…, where symbols “>”, “~” and “||” 
respectively mean “strictly preferred to”, “indifferent to” and “incomparable to”); 
 An importance hierarchy of the agents, which is expressed through a linear rank-ordering (e.g., 
                                                 
1 By a “decision-making agent”, we will consider any of a wide variety of different types of entities; examples could be 
human beings, individual criteria in a multicriteria decision-making process, intelligent entities in the field of artificial 
intelligence, etc.. 
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D1 > D2 > (D3 ~ D4) > …) and not through a set of weights, as in most of the decision-making 
problems (Martel and Ben Khelifa, 2000; Vora et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014); 
 A consensus2 ordering of the alternatives, which represents the solution of the problem.  
Franceschini et al. (2015) classified this specific problem as ordinal semi-democratic; the adjective 
semi-democratic indicates that agents do not necessarily have the same importance, while ordinal 
indicates that their rank is defined by a linear ordering (Nederpelt and Kamareddine, 2004). This 
problem is potentially adaptable to a large number of practical contexts, in which the agents’ 
importance prioritization is dubious and controversial: in these situations, the formulation of a rank-
ordering is certainly simpler and more intuitive than that of a set of weights defined on a ratio scale 
(Chen et al., 2012; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2014; Jessop, 2014). Possible examples are: 
 Management decision problems in which agents are the members of the management board of a 
company/organization and their importance reflects the relevant hierarchical level (e.g., CEO, 
general manager(s), operations manager(s), office manager(s), etc.); 
 Marketing decision problems in which agents are respondents to questionnaires/interviews and 
their importance reflects the relevant level of education (e.g., Ph.D., M.Sc., B.Sc., high school, 
etc.); 
 Competitions for academic positions in which agents are the members of committees and their 
importance reflects the relevant academic position (e.g., full professor, associate professor, 
assistant professor, etc.). 
The problem of aggregating preference orderings, when there is no agents’ importance hierarchy 
(fully democratic case) or it is expressed through a set of weights, is quite old and has been studied 
in various fields, stimulating the development of a variety of solution techniques (Fine and Fine, 
1974; Fishburn, 1974; Hwang and Lin, 1987). For example, in the field of social choice and voting 
theory, we recall the pioneering method by Condorcet (1785) and that by Borda (1781), while, in 
the field of multicriteria decision making, the Electre (Figueira et al., 2005), Promethee (Brans and 
Mareschal, 2005; Corrente et al., 2013), AHP (Saaty, 1980) or TOPSIS (Bilbao-Terol et al., 2014) 
methods. 
On the other hand, the ordinal semi-democratic problem has so far received relatively little 
attention, probably due to its specificity; we recall the contribution of Yager (2001), proposing a 
practical aggregation technique (hereafter denominated as “Yager’s algorithm”, abbreviated as YA), 
and the contributions of Wang (2007) and Franceschini et al. (2015), presenting two ameliorative 
variants of the YA. 
These aggregation techniques, and maybe those that will be proposed in the future, have their pro 
                                                 
2 The adjective “consensus” means that this ordering should reflect the whole preference orderings as much as possible, 
even in the inevitable presence of divergences. 
 3
and contra. For this reason, an interesting question is: For a generic ordinal semi-democratic 
decision-making problem, how could we identify the best aggregation technique? We are aware that 
it is probably impossible to answer this question rigorously, since the “true” solution for a generic 
problem is not known a priori (Figueira et al., 2005; Cook, 2006; Zopounidis et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the performance of different aggregation techniques may be assessed, at least 
roughly, according to various aspects, such as:  
 The ability to produce a solution, which is consistent with the input data; 
 The adaptability to a variety of input data, e.g., preference orderings including omissions and/or 
incomparabilities between alternatives; 
 The efficiency in using the input data for constructing the consensus ordering; e.g., an algorithm 
that focuses on the lower/upper part of the preference orderings only or an algorithm that ignores 
the preference orderings of certain agents cannot be considered as very efficient. 
 Computational complexity. 
Among the aspects above, that concerning the consistency of the solution is particularly important. 
The argument of consistency has been used by Wang (2007) and Franceschini et al. (2015) to prove, 
at least at a conceptual level, the superiority of their variants with respect to the YA. In this context, 
consistency is defined as the ability of a solution to reflect the agents’ preference orderings, while 
reflecting their importance hierarchy, i.e., giving priority to the more important agents.  
In the scientific literature, various tools for consistency checking have been proposed. A common 
feature is that they use some measures of correlation/similarity to compare the consensus ordering 
with the agents’ preference orderings (Ng and Kantor, 2000; Wu and McClean, 2006). For example, 
popular statistics are the Kendall’s tau, the Spearman’s rho, Spearman’s footrule, and Cayley 
distance; see (Lebanon and Lafferty, 2001) for an overview. However, the application range of 
these tools may be limited by several aspects, such as:  
 the degree of “completeness” of the preference orderings; for example, many techniques are not 
easily applicable when some alternatives are tied, omitted or incomparable between each other 
(Brandenburg et al., 2013); 
 the form in which the importance hierarchy of the agents is expressed. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a simple and practical tool to check the degree of consistency 
between the consensus ordering and the input data, for specific ordinal semi-democratic 
decision-making problems. The proposed tool enables two types of consistency evaluations: 
 at a local level, by comparing the consensus ordering with the preference ordering of each j-th 
agent; 
 at a global level, by comparing the consensus ordering with the whole set of preference 
orderings, taking into account the agents’ importance rank-ordering, under the assumption that 
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the most important agents should have a predominant influence on the construction of the 
consensus ordering. 
The consistency verification is performed through the so-called p indicators, as we will show later 
in the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized in two sections. Sect. 2 introduces the 
p indicators, focusing on their construction and practical use. The description is supported by 
several examples. Sect. 3 summarizes the original contributions of this research, focusing on its 
implications, limitations and possible future developments. 
2. The p indicators 
Before getting into the discussion of p indicators, we anticipate that they are virtually applicable to 
every aggregation technique, since they are obtained by comparing the paired-comparison 
relationships derived from one agent’s preference orderings with those derived from the consensus 
ordering. The decision of using paired-comparison relationships is motivated by several reasons: 
1. They allow to express the preference between two alternatives in a natural and intuitive way; 
2. They can be derived from (preference and consensus) orderings, even if some alternatives are 
tied, omitted or incomparable between each others. For the purpose of example, Fig. 1 illustrates 
the transformation of a fictitious partial ordering, with one omitted alternative (d) and two 
incomparable alternatives (a and e), into paired-comparison relationships (Nederpelt and 
Kamareddine, 2004). 
3. They could also be derived from agents’ judgements expressed in other forms (e.g., 
measurements/evaluations on ordinal/interval/ratio scales), as long as they admit relationships of 
order among the alternatives. 
Partial Type of preference ordering 
Incomparable alternatives a with e
b 
c 
a  
(graphic form) 
e 
b > c > (a || e) Ordering (analytic form) 
Omitted alternative d 
Alternatives of interest {a, b, c, e}
Paired comparisons 
a, b 
a, c 
a, d 
a, e 
b, c 
b, d 
b, e 
c, d 
c, e 
d, e 
Relationships 
b > a 
c > a 
a || d 
a || e 
b > c 
b || d 
b > e 
c || d 
c > e 
d || e 
 
 
Fig. 1. Transformation of a fictitious (partial) preference ordering into paired-comparison relationships. 
Symbols “>”, “~” and “||” respectively mean “strictly preferred to”, “indifferent to” and “incomparable to”. 
The remainder of this section is divided into two sub-sections: Sect. 2.1 provides a general 
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description of the p indicators, with an application example, and Sect. 2.2 illustrates the use of p 
indicators, for comparing the results provided by two different aggregation techniques, when 
applied to the same problem. 
2.1 General description 
Tab. 1 presents a summary scheme of the proposed indicators. 
Tab. 1. Summary scheme of the p indicators. 
Type of evaluation Indicator(s) Short description 
Local consistency pj  Indicators depicting the degree of consistency between the consensus ordering and the 
preference ordering by each j-th of the total m agents (j = 1, 2, …, m). 
Global consistency pA Indicator representing the degree of consistency between the consensus ordering and 
the whole set of preference orderings, regardless of the agents’ importance rank-
ordering. 
pB Indicator representing the consistency between the pj indicators and the agents’ 
importance rank-ordering, under the assumption that the preference orderings by the 
most important agents should have a predominant influence on the construction of the 
consensus ordering.
pO Overall synthesis indicator, which aggregates pA and pB. 
 
The pj indicators, associated with each j-th of the total m agents, allow to assess the consistency at a 
local level, while indicators pA and pB – in turn aggregated into pO – allow to assess the consistency 
at a global level; the combination of all these indicators enables a structured evaluation of the 
degree of consistency between consensus ordering and input data, in a generic ordinal semi-
democratic decision-making problem. These two types of indicators are defined and described in 
Sects. 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively. 
2.1.1 pj indicators 
A preliminary operation for determining the pj indicators is constructing a table, which contains the 
paired-comparison relationships obtained from the agents’ preference orderings and the consensus 
ordering. For the purpose of example, let us consider the fictitious decision-making problem in Tab. 
2, in which m = 4 agents formulate their preference orderings concerning n = 5 alternatives (a, b, c, 
d and e); the importance hierarchy of agents is expressed in the form of the rank-ordering 
D1 > D2 > (D3 ~ D4). Incidentally, the preference ordering by D4 is the same (partial) ordering 
represented in Fig. 1. Through some aggregation technique (no matter what), we assume that 
agents’ preference orderings are aggregated into the consensus ordering: d > a > b > c > e. At first 
glance, this consensus ordering seems rather consistent with the agents’ preference orderings, since 
the alternatives a and d generally figure in the top positions, b in the intermediate positions, and c 
and e in the bottom positions of the preference orderings. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the 
agents’ importance hierarchy has been taken into account adequately. We will try to clarify this 
issue by defining suitable quantitative indicators. 
Agents’ preference orderings are transformed into the four sets of paired-comparison relationships 
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reported in Tab. 3(a). Likewise agents’ preference orderings, the consensus ordering is transformed 
into the set of paired-comparison relationships reported in the last column of Tab. 3(a). 
Tab. 2. Input and output data of a fictitious decision-making problem concerning the aggregation of multi-agent 
preference orderings of five alternatives (a, b, c, d and e) into a consensus ordering. 
 
Each j-th agent is associated with an indicator (cj) corresponding to the number of paired 
comparisons, which are usable for evaluating the compatibility between the j-th preference ordering 
and the consensus ordering. Conventionally, we classify as usable a paired comparison not 
producing any relationship of incomparability (“||”), neither in the agent’s preference orderings, nor 
in the consensus ordering, but only relationships of strict preference (“>”) or indifference (“~”). 
Obviously,  nj Cc 2 j-th agent, being nC2  = n·(n – 1)/2 the total number of paired-comparisons for 
n generic alternatives (e.g., 10 in this specific example, since n = 5). 
Subsequently, we construct a “consistency table” (in Tab. 3(b)), which turns the paired-comparison 
relationships of each agent into scores, according to the scoring system in Tab. 4. The conventional 
choice of assigning 0.5 points in the case of weak consistency is justified by the fact that this is the 
intermediate case between that one of full consistency (with score 1) and that of full inconsistency 
(with score 0). The consistency table also reports the sum of the scores (xj) relating to each j-th 
agent.  
Next, for each j-th agent, the portion of consistent paired-comparisons can be calculated as: 
j
j
j c
x
p  , (1) 
being xj the total score related to the j-th agent; 
 cj the number of usable paired comparisons related to the j-th agent. 
It can be noticed that the non-usable paired comparisons do not influence the evaluation of 
consistency, since they have no contribution neither in the xj nor in the cj terms. 
Similarly to other existing measures – e.g., the Kendall’s tau (j) and the Spearman’s rho (j) – pj 
can be interpreted as an indicator of correlation between pairs of orderings (Kendall, 1970; 
Spearman, 1904). Curiously, in the case of orderings without tied, omitted or incomparable 
alternatives, j and pj are linearly related, as shown below: 
 
12
nscombinatiopair  of no. total
pairs discordant of no.pairs concordant of no.
2
2  jn j
n
j
j pC
xCx .            (2) 
(a) Input  (b) Output 
Agent Type of ordering Preference ordering Omitted alternatives Importance rank-ordering 
→ 
Consensus ordering
 
d > a > b > c > e 
D1 Linear (a ~ d) > b > c > e None 
D1 > D2 > (D3 ~ D4) 
D2 Partial d > (a || b) > e > c None 
D3 Linear a > (b ~ d) > (c ~ e) None 
D4 Partial b > c > (a || e) D 
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In this sense, pj can be considered as a variant of j. Two advantages of pj are: (i) the simplicity in 
the calculation, even for orderings with tied, omitted or incomparable alternatives, and (ii) the 
immediate meaning. 
Tab. 3. (a) Table of paired-comparison data relating to the agents’ preference orderings and the consensus 
ordering in Tab. 2. (b) Consistency table relating to the previous orderings; scores are assigned according to the 
scoring system in Tab. 4. 
(a)  (b) 
Paired 
comparison 
From agents’ preference orderings From consensus 
ordering 
 Paired 
comparison
Scores  D1 D2 D3 D4  D1 D2 D3 D4 
a, b 
a, c 
a, d 
a, e 
b, c 
b, d 
b, e 
c, d 
c, e 
d, e 
a > b a || b a > b b > a a > b  a, b 
a, c 
a, d 
a, e 
b, c 
b, d 
b, e 
c, d 
c, e 
d, e 
1 N/A 1 0  
a > c a > c a > c c > a a > c  1 1 1 0  
a ~ d d > a a > d a || d d > a  0.5 1 0 N/A  
a > e a > e a > e a || e a > e  1 1 1 N/A  
b > c b > c b > c b > c b > c  1 1 1 1  
d > b d > b b ~ d b || d d > b  1 1 0.5 N/A  
b > e b > e b > e b > e b > e  1 1 1 1  
d > c d > c d > c c || d d > c  1 1 1 N/A  
c > e e > c c ~ e c > e c > e  1 0 0.5 1  
d > e d > e d > e d || e d > e  1 1 1 N/A  
       cj 10 9 10 5  
  xj 9.5 8 8 3  
        pj 95% 88.9% 80% 60% pA= 83.8%
Note:  
cj is the number of “usable” paired-comparisons; xj is total score of the j-th agent; pj is the ratio xj/cj.
 
Tab. 4. Scoring system used in the construction of the “consistency table”. 
Case Score 
1. Full consistency, i.e., identical relationship of strict preference (“>”) or indifference (“~”). 1 
2. Weak consistency, i.e., consistency with respect to the weak preference relationships only (“> or ~”, i.e., 
strict preference or indifference); e.g., when comparing the relationship a > b with a ~ b. 
0.5 
3. Full inconsistency (with respect to both strict and weak preference relationships); e.g., when comparing 
the relationship a > b with b > a. 
0 
4. Incomparability between the two alternatives, in the agents’ preference orderings and/or in the fused 
ordering. 
N/A 
 
The relatively high values (i.e.,  80%) of the pj indicators related to D1, D2 and D3 indicate that, in 
this case, the aggregation produces a consensus ordering reflecting the agents’ preference orderings 
quite well. The preference ordering by D4 is not very consistent with the consensus ordering, as 
depicted by the relatively low value of p4 = 60%; however this inconsistency is justified by the fact 
that (i) D4 is the least important agent (along with D3) and (ii) the corresponding preference ordering 
provides a limited number of usable paired comparisons (i.e., c4 = 5) for the consistency 
assessment. 
Moreover, the consensus ordering seems to reflect the agents’ importance hierarchy relatively well, 
since pj values tend to decrease as the agents’ importance decreases; this means that the more 
important the agents, the higher the consistency between consensus ordering and preference 
orderings. Sect. 2.1.2 will go into this issue. 
2.1.2 pA, pB and pO 
A rough indication of the overall compatibility between the consensus ordering and the whole set of 
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preference orderings is given by pA, defined as the ratio of xj (i.e., the sum of the total scores xj) 
and cj (i.e., the total number of usable paired comparisons): 
  
























m
j
m
j
j
j
j
m
j
m
j
j
j
j
j
m
j
j
m
j
j
A
c
c
p
c
c
c
x
c
x
p
1
1
1
11
1 .                                                      (3) 
The fourth term in Eq. 3 shows that pA can also be interpreted as a weighted average of the pj 
values, with respect to the corresponding cj values. By applying Eq. 3 to the data in Tab. 3(b) we 
obtain pA = 83.8%. We remark that pA can be used to complement the fragmented information from 
the pj indicators, but it does not take account of the agents’ importance hierarchy. 
The degree of consistency with the agents’ importance hierarchy can be evaluated through pB, i.e., a 
second global indicator, based on the assumption that the preference orderings of the more 
important agents should influence the consensus ordering more than the other ones; therefore they 
should have higher pj values. Following this reasoning, we compare the importance rank-ordering 
of the agents (i.e., D1 > D2 > (D3 ~ D4)) with the ordering based on the relevant pj values. Since 
p1 > p2 > p3 > p4, the related agents’ importance rank-ordering is D1 > D2 > D3 > D4. 
The comparison between the two orderings is carried out by repeating the exercise seen in 
Sect. 2.1.1 when constructing the pj indicators, namely: (i) decomposing the two orderings into 
paired-comparison relationships, (ii) comparing them and assigning some scores according to the 
conventions in Tab. 5(3), (iii) determining the sum of the xB scores, and (iv) constructing pB, defined 
as: 
B
B
B c
xp  , (4) 
                                                 
3 Two are the differences between the scoring system in Tab. 5 and that in Tab. 4. The first is that the new scoring 
system does not include the possibility of incomparability, since the pj ordering and the agents’ importance rank-
ordering are both linear and do not include any incomparability relationship (Nederpelt and Kamareddine, 2004). The 
second is that the new scoring system is more “indulgent” than that in Tab. 4, since it assigns a unitary score even the 
case of weak consistency (i.e., consistency with respect to the relationship “> or ~”). This choice is justified by the fact 
that it is very unlikely to expect a strict correspondence between relationships of indifference, in both the importance 
rank-ordering and the pj ordering; in fact, two pj values are considered indifferent only if they coincide exactly. 
Moreover, the adoption of the scoring system in Tab. 4 could lead to paradoxical situations, such as the following one: 
three agents formulate three preference orderings, which are completely consistent with the consensus ordering, i.e., 
p1 = p2 = p3 = 100% (this would be the extreme case where all the preference orderings and the consensus ordering 
coincide), and the agents’ importance rank-ordering is D1 > D2 > D3. Applying the scoring system in Tab. 4, we would 
obtain pB = 50%, which is an unduly penalizing result for this situation of ideal consistency; on the other hand, when 
applying the scoring system in Tab. 6, we would obtain pB = 100%, eliminating the paradox. 
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being mB Cc 2  the number of usable paired comparisons (i.e., 6 in this case). We observe that both 
the orderings are linear and do not include any incomparable alternatives. Tab. 5 shows the 
paired-comparison data relating to the two orderings and the so-called consistency string(4), which 
contains the corresponding scores. For the problem exemplified, the value of pB = 100% indicates 
excellent compatibility between the consensus ordering and the pj ordering. 
Pushing to the extreme the synthesis, the two complementary indicators pA and pB can be 
synthesized into an overall indicator: 
pO = min(pA, pB).                                                       (5) 
The synthesis by the min() operator allows condensing the results of the consistency analysis into a 
single number. It is implicitly assumed that the aspects described by pA and pB are equally 
important. 
 
Tab. 5. Conventional scores used for constructing the “consistency string”, when comparing the paired-
comparison relationships from the pj ordering with those from the agents’ importance hierarchy. 
Case Score 
1. Full or weak consistency, i.e., consistency with respect to strict preference or indifference relationship (“> 
or ~”); e.g., when comparing the relationship D1 > D2 with itself or with D1 ~ D2. 
1 
2. Full inconsistency (with respect to strict preference or indifference relationships); e.g., when comparing the 
relationship D1 > D2 with D2 > D1. 
0 
 
Tab. 6. (a) Paired-comparison data relating to the pj ordering (i.e., D1 > D2 > D3 > D4) and the agents’ importance 
rank-ordering (i.e., D1 > D2 > (D3 ~ D4). (b) Consistency string relating to the same orderings; scores are assigned 
according to the scoring system in Tab. 5. 
(a)  (b) 
Paired 
comparison 
From agents’ importance 
rank-ordering 
From the 
pj ordering 
 
Paired comparison Scores 
D1, D2 D1 > D2 D1 > D2  D1, D2 1 
D1, D3 D1 > D3 D1 > D3  D1, D3 1 
D1, D4 D1 > D4 D1 > D4  D1, D4 1 
D2, D3 D2 > D3 D2 > D3  D2, D3 1 
D2, D4 D2 > D4 D2 > D4  D2, D4 1 
D3, D4 D3 ~ D4 D3 > D4  D3, D4 1 
    cB 6 
    xB 6 
    pB 100% 
Note:  
cB is the number of “usable” paired-comparisons; xB is the relevant total score; pB is the ratio xB/cB. 
 
2.2 Comparisons between different solutions 
This section illustrates the use of the p indicators for comparing the solutions obtained from 
different techniques, which are applied to the same ordinal semi-democratic decision-making 
problem. Let us consider a fictitious problem, in which five different alternatives (a, b, c, d, and e) 
are examined. These alternatives are evaluated by three agents (D1 to D3), ranked in terms of 
                                                 
4 The expression “consistency string” is used to avoid confusion with the “consistency table”, defined in Sect. 2.1.1. 
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importance, according to the linear ordering D1 > D2 > D3. Tab. 7(a) summarizes the input data of 
the problem.  
Tab. 7. Fictitious decision-making problem, concerning the aggregation of three preference orderings of five 
alternatives into a consensus ordering. The two consensus orderings in the last column are obtained by applying 
the Yager’s algorithm (YA) and the Enhanced Yager’s Algorithm (EYA), respectively. 
 
The agents’ preference orderings are aggregated into a single consensus ordering through two 
different aggregation techniques: (i) the YA and (ii) the Enhanced Yager’s Algorithm, hereafter 
abbreviated as EYA. These techniques generate the two consensus orderings reported in Tab. 7(b). 
For more information on the YA and the EYA, we refer the reader to Yager (2001) and 
Franceschini et al. (2015), respectively. 
In spite of being originated from the same input data, the two consensus orderings are deeply 
different from each other, except for the fact that alternative b is in the second position and e is in 
the last position for both of them. Which consensus ordering better reflects the input data?  
At a qualitative level, the second one is probably better than the first one, as it is not so dissimilar 
from the preference orderings of the two most important agents (i.e., D1 and D2). At a quantitative 
level, the local consistency can be assessed through the pj indicators. To facilitate the construction 
of these indicators, preference orderings are turned into paired-comparison data (see the first four 
columns in Tab. 8). In this specific case, the preference orderings are all linear (and not partial), 
therefore they will not include any omissions or incomparabilities between the alternatives. 
Likewise the preference orderings, the two consensus orderings are turned into paired-comparison 
data (see the last two columns of Tab. 8).  
In Sects. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we construct the p indicators relating to the solution from the YA and the 
EYA respectively; Sect. 2.2.3 provides a comparison between pj, which is the “elementary block” 
of the p indicators, and other popular correlation measures; in Sect. 2.2.4, we represent the p 
indicators by means of the so-called p-diagram. 
 
 
 
 
(a) Input  (b) Output 
Agent Type of ordering Preference ordering Importance rank-ordering
→ 
Consensus orderings 
D1 Linear c > a > b > d > e 
D1 > D2 > D3 
YA: a > b > d > c > e 
D2 Linear c > b > (a ~ d) > e EYA: c > b > a > d > e 
D3 Linear b > (a ~ d) > e > c 
 11
Tab. 8. Paired-comparison data, related to the three agents’ preference orderings and the two consensus 
orderings in Tab. 7. 
Paired 
comparison 
From agents’ preference 
orderings 
From consensus 
orderings 
D1 D2 D3 YA EYA 
a, b a > b b > a b > a a > b b > a
a, c c > a c > a a > c a > c c > a 
a, d a > d a ~ d a ~ d a > d a > d 
a, e a > e a > e a > e a > e a > e 
b, c c > b c > b b > c b > c c > b 
b, d b > d b > d b > d b > d b > d 
b, e b > e b > e b > e b > e b > e 
c, d c > d c > d d > c d > c c > d 
c, e c > e c > e e > c c > e c > e 
d, e d > e d > e d > e d > e d > e 
2.2.1 Case of the YA 
Tab. 9 contains the consistency table concerning the consensus ordering of the YA (compare it with 
the data in Tab. 8). Due to the absence of omitted and incomparable alternatives in the preference 
orderings and consensus ordering, the total number of usable paired comparisons will be 
  1052nj Cc j-th agent. 
Tab. 9. Consistency table concerning the solution provided by the YA and the preference orderings in Tab.8; 
scores are assigned according to the scoring system in Tab. 4. 
Paired 
comparison 
Scores  D1 D2 D3 
a, b 1 0 0  
a, c 0 0 1  
a, d 1 0.5 0.5  
a, e 1 1 1  
b, c 0 0 1  
b, d 1 1 1  
b, e 1 1 1  
c, d 0 0 1  
c, e 1 1 0  
d, e 1 1 1  
cj 10 10 10  
xj 7 5.5 7.5  
pj 70.0% 55.0% 75.0% pA= 66.7% 
 
The pj values related to the three agents are reported at the bottom of Tab. 9. The fact that they are 
relatively low (i.e., ≤ 75%) denotes a relatively poor consistency between consensus ordering and 
agents’ preference orderings. This impression is confirmed by the relatively low value of the global 
indicator pA = 66.7%, obtained by applying Eq. 3. Also, the agents’ importance hierarchy is not very 
well reflected by the resulting pj ordering (see Tab. 10), as denoted by the low value of pB = 33.3%. 
Consequently, pO = min(66.7%, 33.3%) = 33.3%. 
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Tab. 10. (a) Paired-comparison data relating to the pj ordering and the agents’ importance rank-ordering, in the 
case of the YA. (b) Consistency string relating to the same orderings; scores are assigned according to the scoring 
system in Tab. 5. 
(a)  (b) 
Paired 
comparison 
From agents’ importance 
rank-ordering 
From the 
pj ordering 
 
Paired comparison Scores 
D1, D2 D1 > D2 D1 > D2  D1, D2 1 
D1, D3 D1 > D3 D3 > D1  D1, D3 0 
D2, D3 D2 > D3 D3 > D2  D2, D3 0 
    cB 3 
    xB 1 
    pB 33.3% 
 
2.2.2 Case of the EYA 
The consistency table concerning the consensus ordering by the EYA is shown in Tab. 11; it is 
significantly different from that in Tab. 9, due to several variations in the paired-comparison 
relationships. The pj values of the two most important agents are significantly higher than those 
obtained for the YA. The pA value (80.0%) is significantly higher than that in the case of the YA, 
denoting a significant improvement in terms of consistency between consensus ordering and the 
whole set of preference orderings. Consistency has also improved at the level of the agents’ 
importance hierarchy, as the value of pB = 66.7% is twice that obtained for the YA (see the 
construction in Tab. 12). Consequently, pO = min(80.0%, 66.7%) = 66.7%. 
Tab. 11. Consistency table concerning the solution provided by the EYA and the preference orderings in Tab. 8; 
scores are assigned according to the scoring system in Tab. 4. 
Paired 
comparison 
Scores  D1 D2 D3 
a, b 0 1 1  
a, c 1 1 0  
a, d 1 0.5 0.5  
a, e 1 1 1  
b, c 1 1 0  
b, d 1 1 1  
b, e 1 1 1  
c, d 1 1 0  
c, e 1 1 0  
d, e 1 1 1  
cj 10 10 10  
xj 9 9.5 5.5  
pj 90.0% 95.0% 55.0% pA= 80% 
Tab. 12. (a) Paired-comparison data relating to the pj ordering and the agents’ importance rank-ordering, in the 
case of the EYA. (b) Consistency string relating to the same orderings; scores are assigned according to the 
scoring system in Tab. 5. 
(a)  (b) 
Paired 
comparison 
From agents’ importance 
rank-ordering 
From the 
pj ordering 
 
Paired comparison Score 
D1, D2 D1 > D2 D2 > D1  D1, D2 0 
D1, D3 D1 > D3 D1 > D3  D1, D3 1 
D2, D3 D2 > D3 D2 > D3  D2, D3 1 
    cB 3 
    xB 2 
    pB 66.7% 
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2.2.3 Comparison between pj and other correlation measures 
The pj indicators are the “elementary blocks” of the proposed tool. Their plausibility, as measures of 
consistency/correlation between a generic j-th preference ordering and the consensus ordering, can 
be assessed through a simple exercise. Since, in the problem examined, agents’ preference orderings 
and consensus orderings are all linear, it is simple to calculate two popular correlation measures – 
i.e., the Kendall’s tau (j) and the Spearman’s rho (j) – and compare them with the relevant pj 
values(5) (Kendall, 1970; Spearman, 1904). 
Fig. 2 provides a graphical representation of the pj, j and j values, calculated combining the three 
preference orderings related to D1, D2 and D3, and the two consensus orderings obtained by 
applying the YA and the EYA. The calculation of j and j was performed using the relevant 
functions in the MINITAB® statistical software. Although the three correlation measures are based 
on different logics, there is a general agreement: in fact, the agent rank-orderings based on the pj, j 
and j values are coincident – i.e., D3 > D1 > D2 for the YA and D2 > D1 > D3 for the EYA. 
The calculation of pj, compared to that of j and j, is more practical for partial preference orderings 
(Franceschini et al., 2007); also, pj probably has a more immediate meaning. 
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
D1 D2 D3 D1 D2 D3 
pj  
j  
j 
(a) YA (b) EYA 
pj 70.0% 55.5% 75.0% 90.0% 95.0% 55.0% 
j 40.0% 10.5% 52.7% 80.0% 94.9% 10.5% 
40.0% 22.5% 72.5% 90.0% 97.5% -2.5% j  
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the pj, j and j values, calculated for each combination of preference ordering 
and consensus ordering. 
2.2.4 Graphical representation through the p-diagram 
The so-called p-diagram, in Fig. 3, provides a practical “snapshot” of the comparative analysis 
between the solution from the YA and that from the EYA. The profile of the EYA solution is 
significantly higher than that of the YA solution, from almost all points of view, denoting a 
significantly higher consistency with input data. 
                                                 
5 We remark that, while pj [0, 1], j and j [-1, 1]. 
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B 
33.3% 
66.7% 
  
YA: 
EYA: 
YA
EYA
 
Fig. 3. pj-diagram concerning the solutions obtained by the YA and the EYA, when applied to the ordinal semi-
democratic decision-making problem in Tab. 7. 
3. Discussion 
The p indicators represent a simple and intuitive tool for assessing the consistency between 
consensus ordering and agents’ preference orderings, in ordinal semi-democratic decision-making 
problems. The pj indicators show the level of consistency between the solution and the individual 
preference orderings and can be aggregated into the pA indicator. The pB indicator complements the 
information provided by pA, taking into account the agents’ importance hierarchy. Next, pA and pB 
can be synthesized into the overall indicator pO. 
These indicators are very versatile since they can be applied in the presence of omissions and/or 
incomparabilities between alternatives, both in the agents’ preference orderings and consensus 
ordering. Theoretically, they could be applied even in the case in which the agents’ judgements 
and/or the solution of the problem were expressed in other forms – such as 
measurements/evaluations on ordinal/interval/ratio scales – as long as they could be transformed 
into paired-comparison relationships. Other advantages of p indicators are (i) the immediate 
meaning and (ii) the relatively simple calculation. 
It was also shown that the p indicators may assist in comparing the solutions generated by two (or 
more) techniques, in a specific ordinal semi-democratic decision-making problem. To this end, the 
representation provided by the p-diagram is particularly useful and effective. 
The p indicators were presented as a passive tool for checking the consistency of the solution of one 
or more aggregation techniques, in a specific decision-making problem. Reversing this perspective, 
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they could be used actively, i.e., as parameters to maximize, for identifying the “optimal(6)” 
consensus ordering(s). A possible approach would be that one based on the maximization of pO, i.e., 
the overall synthesis indicator. In this case, the optimal consensus ordering – which is that one for 
which pO assumes the maximum possible value (i.e., MAXOp ) – may be determined by: (i) 
automatically generating all the possible solutions to a specific problem, through ad hoc software, 
(ii) determining the corresponding pO for each of them, and (iii) selecting the solution(s) for which 
pO = MAXOp . Knowing the optimal consensus ordering(s) and the corresponding 
MAX
Op  value may be 
useful for better assessing the performance of a certain technique, in a specific problem. For 
example, a technique that provides a solution with a pO = 79%, in a decision-making problem where 
MAX
Op = 80%, will perform certainly better than a technique that provides a solution with pO = 80%, 
in a problem where MAXOp = 98%. In fact, in problems where the agents’ preference orderings have a 
high degree of similarity, the MAXOp  value will tend to increase (since it will be easier to find a 
consensus ordering, which is compatible with the whole set of agents’ preference orderings and 
their importance hierarchy), while in others in which the differences are greater, it will tend to 
decrease (since it will be more complicated to find a consensus ordering, which is compatible with 
the whole set of agents’ preference orderings and their importance hierarchy). In this sense, MAXOp  
could be also seen as a measure of the degree of “dissimilarity” between the agents’ preference 
orderings.  
Future research will aim at deepening this aspect. Also, we will propose new tools for 
complementing the p indicators and enriching the verification of the solutions generated by 
different aggregation techniques. Finally, we plan to generalize the p indicators so that they are 
adaptable to the majority of decision-making problems, in which (i) agents can use different formats 
to express their preferences and (ii) their importance hierarchy is expressed through a set of 
weights. 
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